McMahon to Rep. Summer Lee: “We Should Teach Accurately” — Refuses to Confirm Biden Won 2020 as “Illegal DEI”; Sen. Kennedy-Lutnick Exchange on Vietnam: “If Vietnam Offered Zero Tariffs Both Ways, Would You Accept?” Lutnick: “Absolutely Not — They Buy $90B from China, Mark It Up, Send It to Us — Just a Pathway of China to Us”

Two fascinating exchanges illustrated administration policy frameworks in early June 2025. In a House hearing, Rep. Summer Lee (D-PA) tried to trap Education Secretary Linda McMahon about whether teaching that Biden won the 2020 election would be “illegal DEI.” Lee: “Do you believe that social studies standards that teach that Biden won the 2020 election is an ‘illegal DEI’? Yes or no?” McMahon: “I think I have said we should teach accurately.” Lee: “You have not answered the question.” McMahon: “I’m just not giving you the answer you want.” Separately, Sen. John Kennedy (R-LA) asked Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick a hypothetical: “If Vietnam, for example, came to you tomorrow and said, ‘OK Mr. Secretary, you win. We’re going to remove all tariffs and all trade barriers. Would the United States please do the same?’ Would you accept that deal?” Lutnick: “Absolutely not. Absolutely not. That would be the silliest thing we could do. Vietnam has a $125 billion in exports to us and imports from us, $12 and a half million dollars. They buy $90 billion from China, then they mark it up and send it to us. So you would just be a pathway of China to us. We wouldn’t accept that deal. It’s a terrible deal.”

The Summer Lee Trap

Rep. Summer Lee (D-PA) designed a pointed question for McMahon.

“How about social studies standards that teach that president Biden won the 2020 election?” Lee asked.

McMahon’s first response: “I think our study should all be taught accurately.”

Lee pressed: “Yes or no?”

McMahon repeated: “I think our study should be taught accurately.”

Lee tried to clarify: “The question was, do you believe that social studies standards that teach that president Biden won the 2020 election is an illegal DEI? Yes or no?”

McMahon’s principled response: “I think I have said we should teach accurately.”

Lee expressed frustration: “No, you have not answered the question. I don’t understand why you’re incapable of answering.”

McMahon’s final response: “I’m just not giving you the answer you want.”

Lee: “No, I want the answer, whatever your answer is.”

McMahon: “I just gave you the answer.”

Lee: “No, the answer is yes or no.”

The Specific Trap

Lee’s question was designed as a political trap.

The trap’s structure:

Teaching Biden won 2020 was factually accurate (electoral college outcome)
Labeling this teaching as “illegal DEI” would be absurd
If McMahon said “no,” Democrats would claim she accepted the teaching
If McMahon said “yes,” Democrats would claim she denied 2020 election results
Either answer could be weaponized politically

McMahon’s response strategy:

Refuse to accept the framing
Insist on accurate teaching as the standard
Avoid partisan false dilemmas
Maintain principled position
Force Lee to accept the principle of accuracy

Why this worked:

Teaching should be accurate (uncontroversial)
Biden won the 2020 election as determined by electoral college (factual)
Teaching this fact would not be “illegal DEI”
But McMahon wasn’t forced to endorse specific teaching content
The principle of accuracy was what mattered

McMahon’s “I’m just not giving you the answer you want” was masterful political communication. She refused Lee’s framing while staying principled.

The Larger DEI Context

The “illegal DEI” framing reflected the Trump administration’s approach to civil rights enforcement.

What was being targeted:

Explicit racial preferences in hiring, admissions, contracts
Programs that discriminated based on race or sex
Identity-based curricula that taught one group to disadvantage another
Quotas or targets that required specific demographic outcomes
Discriminatory approaches to college admissions

What was NOT being targeted:

Teaching accurate history
Teaching about civil rights movements
Teaching about diverse American communities
Teaching about discrimination’s historical reality
Teaching that promoted equal treatment

The distinction:

Accurate factual teaching: acceptable
Accurate factual teaching that acknowledged diversity: acceptable
Discriminatory policies or curricula that privileged some groups over others: unacceptable
Indoctrination that taught students to categorize themselves and others by race as primary: unacceptable

Summer Lee’s question tried to blur this distinction. By asking if teaching Biden won 2020 was “illegal DEI,” Lee was suggesting that factual teaching could be categorized as discriminatory. This was a rhetorical effort to expand “DEI” to include basic factual instruction — which would make McMahon look like she opposed teaching historical facts.

McMahon’s response correctly identified the issue: accurate teaching was fine. Discriminatory policies were not. These were different categories.

The Kennedy-Lutnick Exchange

Sen. John Kennedy (R-LA) asked Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick a devastating hypothetical.

“If Vietnam, for example, came to you tomorrow and said, ‘OK, Mr. Secretary, you win. We’re going to remove all tariffs and all trade barriers. Would the United States please do the same?’ Would you accept that deal?” Kennedy asked.

Lutnick’s response was immediate and emphatic: “Absolutely not. Absolutely not. That would be the silliest thing we could do.”

The Stunning Answer

Kennedy’s question had assumed that reciprocal zero-tariff trade was the obvious ideal goal.

The traditional economic framework:

Free trade eliminates distortions
Zero tariffs on both sides is “pure” reciprocity
Any deviation from zero tariffs represents inefficiency
Ideal economic policy maximizes free trade
Any country offering zero tariffs should receive zero tariffs in return

Under this framework, Kennedy’s hypothetical should have been the ideal answer. If Vietnam offered complete reciprocity, the United States should accept. That would be the maximum economic freedom.

Lutnick’s “absolutely not” rejection was therefore surprising. But his reasoning was substantive.

The China Pathway Problem

Lutnick explained why the deal would be bad.

“Vietnam has $125 billion in exports to us and imports from us, $12 and a half billion dollars,” Lutnick said.

Kennedy responded: “I’m aware of the figures, but tell me where they get it from.”

Lutnick delivered the key insight: “They buy $90 billion from China, then they mark it up and send it to us. So you would just a pathway of China to us.”

He summarized: “You wouldn’t accept that deal. It’s a terrible deal.”

The Pathway Economics

Lutnick’s “pathway of China to us” described a specific economic phenomenon.

How the Vietnam pathway worked:

China produces $90 billion worth of goods (tariffed by US)
China sells those goods to Vietnam at Chinese prices
Vietnam buys from China
Vietnam marks up the goods by some margin
Vietnam sells to the US as “Vietnamese” exports
Goods enter US without US-China tariffs
Americans pay for goods that are substantially Chinese

Why this was bad for US:

China effectively avoids US tariffs
American manufacturing still can’t compete
Vietnamese “production” is often just trans-shipment
Economic value flows primarily to China
Tariff revenue for US Treasury is reduced
American jobs still compete against Chinese pricing
Supply chain dependencies on China continue

Why Vietnam would offer zero tariffs:

Vietnam doesn’t care about protecting its tiny US imports
Vietnam’s manufacturing is largely assembly of Chinese parts
Vietnam benefits from US market access
Vietnam loses little from zero tariffs both ways
Vietnam’s economic interest is selling American-bound goods
Vietnam has limited domestic market to protect

Why US should reject:

Zero tariffs would enable Chinese pass-through
American manufacturing benefits nothing from Vietnamese zero tariffs
US Treasury loses tariff revenue
Strategic goal of reducing China dependency is undermined
Economic sovereignty is compromised through pathway

”We’re the One with Money, We’re the One with Store”

Lutnick articulated the leverage asymmetry.

“We’re the one with money. We’re the one with the store,” Lutnick said.

He elaborated: “Of course, I want to take down the purpose of reciprocity.”

Then Kennedy challenged: “Then is reciprocity not one of your goals? Are you telling the president that we shouldn’t seek reciprocity? If that’s what you’re telling him, why are you trying to do these trade deals?”

Lutnick refined: “We want to encourage Vietnam to produce products. They’re great at producing.”

Kennedy pressed: “I want to get back to reciprocity. You just said, you don’t believe that you don’t accept reciprocity as a goal. What are you negotiating in these trade?”

Lutnick gave the principle: “Why would we open our bank account and their bank account?”

Kennedy challenged: “Why are you negotiating trade deals? You’re trying to get other countries to lower their trade, their tariffs and trade barriers in return for us lowering ours.”

Lutnick refined further: “I think that’s true for the things that they’ll take from us. That’s called reciprocity. Of course.”

The Reciprocity Distinction

Kennedy pushed for a clear answer: “Are you or are you not seeking reciprocity in these trade deals?”

Lutnick: “We are absolutely seeking reciprocity with respect to things that can be reciprocal. When they’re imported from China and sending it to us, they’re not.”

The Specific Framework

Lutnick’s framework was nuanced:

True reciprocity is acceptable:

When Vietnam produces goods themselves
When Vietnamese products compete on their actual merits
When trade is balanced with actual manufacturing
When lower tariffs support genuine commerce
When both countries benefit economically

Fake reciprocity is unacceptable:

When Vietnam is pathway for Chinese goods
When “Vietnamese” exports are just relabeled Chinese exports
When zero tariffs enable strategic evasion
When economic value flows primarily to third parties
When security concerns override economic theory

The judgment requires:

Understanding actual supply chains
Recognition of strategic considerations
Awareness of trade restructuring techniques
Sophisticated analysis of bilateral trade flows
Willingness to refuse superficial “wins”

Kennedy’s Challenge

Kennedy continued probing.

“You just said that if a country came to you and offered you the ultimate reciprocity, no tariffs, no trade barriers in return for us doing the same, you would reject that.”

Lutnick: “Of course, because they buy from China and send it to us.”

Kennedy pivoted: “Don’t you agree with me? Supposedly said we won’t buy from China. Now we’re talking. Now we’re talking. Would you accept that deal?”

Lutnick: “We would consider it for what things for products.”

Kennedy: “Want to change?”

Lutnick laid out exceptions: “Well, there are certain products we want to reassure. We don’t want other people making them. We want to make pharmaceuticals here. We need to protect ourselves.”

The “Re-Assure” Framework

Lutnick’s use of “reassure” (likely meant “ensure” or “re-insource”) captured a key policy goal.

Products that must be made in America:

Pharmaceutical ingredients (essential health security)
Critical defense components (national security)
Key infrastructure materials (economic resilience)
Strategic metals and minerals (military and tech)
Advanced semiconductors (AI and defense)

Why this matters beyond economics:

Pandemic showed pharmaceutical vulnerabilities
Taiwan crisis shows semiconductor vulnerabilities
Rare earth disputes show critical material vulnerabilities
Defense supply chain gaps create military risks
Infrastructure dependencies create leverage over US

Trade policy framework:

Accept trade for non-strategic products
Restrict or eliminate trade for strategic products
Build American capacity for strategic products
Maintain flexibility for evolving strategic categories
Coordinate trade policy with national security policy

This was more sophisticated than simple free trade or protectionism. It was strategic trade policy that:

Recognized some products as economic commodities
Recognized other products as strategic necessities
Applied different policies to different categories
Built American capability in critical areas
Maintained efficient trade for non-critical products

The “Why Open Our Bank Account?” Framework

Lutnick’s “Why would we open our bank account and their bank account?” framing was important.

The traditional framework:

Open markets benefit both sides
Free trade maximizes aggregate welfare
Producers in both countries gain access
Consumers in both countries pay lower prices
Economic theory supports free trade

Lutnick’s framework:

Consumers in US have large bank account
Consumers in many countries have small bank account
“Opening both bank accounts” gives foreign producers access to US wealth
But US producers get access to foreign poverty
The trade is unequal in practice
Strategic US interest requires protecting the US bank account

Implications:

US should charge for access to its wealthy consumer market
Foreign producers should pay for access through tariffs
US should only reduce tariffs when receiving meaningful reciprocal benefits
Meaningful benefits require actual market access, not just formal reciprocity
Strategic considerations trump simple reciprocity

This was economic realism. The US market was more valuable to foreign producers than foreign markets were to US producers. “Reciprocity” in formal terms was not reciprocity in practical terms.

The Strategic Implications

Lutnick’s framework had broader implications for trade policy:

For trade negotiations:

Don’t accept superficial reciprocity
Analyze actual supply chain origins
Protect American strategic industries
Use market access as leverage
Demand substantive rather than formal reciprocity

For supply chains:

Understand where goods actually come from
Track value chain origins
Identify China pass-throughs
Prevent tariff evasion via third countries
Restore American manufacturing capability

For economic theory:

Challenge simple free trade assumptions
Recognize strategic dimensions of trade
Account for national security considerations
Accept that economics alone is insufficient framework
Integrate economics with broader national interest

For policy implementation:

Specific country-by-country analysis
Product-by-product evaluation
Strategic categorization of imports
Flexible response to changing conditions
Coordinated across multiple policy areas

Key Takeaways

McMahon refuses Summer Lee’s trap: “We should teach accurately” — neither endorsing nor denying “illegal DEI” framing on 2020 election teaching.
McMahon: “I’m just not giving you the answer you want” — principled refusal of politically constructed dilemma.
Lutnick on Vietnam zero-tariff hypothetical: “Absolutely not. Silliest thing we could do.”
The China pathway: “They buy $90B from China, mark it up, send to us. You’d just be pathway of China to us.”
Strategic trade framework: “True reciprocity for things they’ll take from us. China pathway is not reciprocity.”