Brown University Student Alex Shieh Testifies on Ivy League “Cartel”: $93K Tuition × 7,000 Students = $700M/Year, 3,805 Administrators (More Than Students in Many Depts); Asked “What Do You Do All Day?” — Most Didn’t Respond; Brown Charged Him with “Emotional and Psychological Harm”; Chairman Jordan Exposes the “Bloat”

In a stunning June 2025 House committee hearing on Ivy League antitrust violations, Brown University student Alex Shieh testified about his Bloat@Brown investigation. Chairman Jim Jordan walked through the math: “What did you say tuition was again? $93,064 in direct costs including room and board… How many students at Brown? Over 7,000… That’s a lot of money coming in. $93,000 times 7,000… It’s like $700 million coming into Brown every year.” Shieh had asked a simple question: “Where the heck is all the money going?” When he checked the administrators: “I think the number you said was 3,805.” Shieh, working for the conservative Brown Spectator, had sent emails to the 3,800 administrators asking them: “What do you do all day?” The result: “Most of them didn’t respond.” Then Brown retaliated: “We were hit with disciplinary charges. First it was emotional and psychological harm, invasion of privacy and misrepresentation.” Then they charged the Brown Spectator’s entire board of directors for violating Brown’s trademark. Jordan exposed the broader cartel: “You can have a bloated bureaucracy when you’re colluding on price… when you limit output… when you engage in perfect price discrimination.” Jordan’s summary: “They don’t want anyone to look under the covers and see they’re colluding on price, limiting output, and doing perfect price discrimination.”

The Math of Brown

Jordan walked through the arithmetic.

“Mr. Shea, what did you say tuition was again at Brown annual tuition?” Jordan asked.

Shieh answered: “It’s $93,064 in direct costs.”

Jordan clarified: “$93, that doesn’t count room and board and books and everything, that’s just tuition, right?”

Shieh corrected: “No, that’s including room and board.”

Jordan confirmed: “That’s everything? Okay, $93,000.”

Jordan continued with the student count: “How many students you say again was at Brown? Over 7,000 I think you said?”

Shieh: “7,000.”

Jordan did the math: “Yeah, so that’s a lot of money coming in. Maybe it could be some grants, it could be some loans, whatever, but $93,000 times 7,000.”

Jordan delivered the calculation: “It’s like $700 million coming into Brown every year.”

The Brown Cost Scale

The $93,064 annual tuition (with room and board) was extraordinary.

Brown University scale:

7,000+ undergraduate students
$93,000+ per student annually
$700+ million in student revenue alone
Plus research grants, endowment returns, alumni giving
Total revenue likely $1.5-2 billion annually

Comparison to state universities:

Average state university tuition: $15,000-25,000
Brown’s tuition 4-5x higher than state universities
Most state universities have much larger enrollment
Per-student revenue advantage massive
Brown had exceptional financial resources

The investment returned:

Brown endowment: approximately $6 billion+
Harvard endowment: approximately $50 billion
Yale endowment: approximately $40 billion
Princeton endowment: approximately $35 billion
Columbia endowment: approximately $14 billion
Cumulative Ivy League endowments: $150+ billion

Why tuition was so high:

Ivy League brand premium
Family willingness to pay
Competitive pressure among elite universities
Administrative bloat driving costs
Price collusion (alleged in this hearing)
Cost structures unrelated to educational quality

The Fundamental Question

Jordan framed Shieh’s investigation.

“And you asked a fundamental question, sort of a simple question,” Jordan said.

Shieh: “Yes, question.”

Jordan: “Where the heck’s all the money going, right?”

The Answer: Administrators

Jordan described Shieh’s discovery.

“And you said, maybe I’ll check the administrators. How many administrators are having? You said, I think the number you said was 3,805, is that right?” Jordan asked.

Shieh: “Yep.”

The 3,805 Administrator Problem

The administrator count was extraordinary.

The ratio:

3,805 administrators at Brown
7,000+ undergraduate students
Approximately 1 administrator per 1.8 students
Almost one-to-one ratio
Historic administrative bloat

Comparison to historical norms:

1970s university administrator ratios: 1 per 50+ students
1990s ratios: 1 per 20-25 students
2010s ratios: 1 per 10-15 students
2020s Ivy League: 1 per 2-4 students
Exponential growth in administration

Why this was problematic:

Administrators don’t teach classes
Administrators don’t research
Administrators are essentially overhead
Administrative salaries are often high
Administrative bloat drives tuition up

The composition of bloat:

Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) staff
Marketing and communications
Fundraising and development
Compliance departments
Student services (non-academic)
Various identity-based offices
Sustainability and environmental staff
Multiple layers of dean assistants
HR and administrative support
Many other categories

The Simple Question

Shieh had asked the administrators a simple question.

“And then you said a letter to these guys asking another fundamental question. What do you do all day?” Jordan asked.

Jordan inquired: “What was the response you said? Most of them didn’t get back with you?”

Shieh’s revealing answer: “Most of them didn’t respond and we were hit with disciplinary charges.”

The Non-Response Problem

The non-response was itself informative.

What Shieh asked:

What do you do all day?
What tasks have you performed this week?
What would happen if your position were eliminated?

What Shieh expected:

Clear descriptions of job duties
Specific tasks accomplished
Clear value proposition
Demonstrable impact on students

What administrators did:

Most ignored the email
Some complained to superiors
Some reported Shieh to Brown administration
Few provided substantive answers
Even fewer defended their value

What the non-response suggested:

Administrators couldn’t justify their jobs
Positions were essentially redundant
Workloads didn’t justify full-time employment
Many roles were duplicative
Administrative bloat was real

Shieh’s observation: “Some of them answered, and the ones who answered seemed to have pretty useful jobs. I guess we can infer that the ones who didn’t have jobs that are not so important.”

The Retaliation

Jordan described Brown’s response to Shieh’s investigation.

“So the administrators couldn’t respond to a simple question. You’re taking in $700 million a year. What the heck are you 3,800 administrators doing?”

He pivoted to the retaliation: “The administrators didn’t respond, but the administration came after you. Is that right?”

Shieh: “That’s right.”

Jordan delivered the observation: “When you investigate the administration, it turns out they investigate you back.”

The Specific Charges

Jordan asked about the specific charges.

“Why do you think they did that? Why did they come after you? Well, first of all, what did they come after you about? What did you allegedly do wrong?”

Shieh listed the charges: “Well, first it was emotional and psychological harm, invasion of privacy and misrepresentation. And then they decided to charge me with violating the technology policy.”

Jordan’s incredulous response: “Asking someone how they spend your money is emotional harm. That’s what they alleged?”

Shieh: “Apparently.”

The “Emotional Harm” Charge

The specific charges were absurd.

“Emotional and psychological harm”:

Asking administrators what they do
Using polite professional email format
Following standard journalism practices
Treating subjects with respect
Nothing remotely harmful

“Invasion of privacy”:

Administrators’ jobs are public
Their duties are relevant to students paying tuition
Their work affects the institution
Nothing private being asked
Standard journalism territory

“Misrepresentation”:

No false claims made
Clear identification of purpose
Legitimate journalism
Transparent about intent
Standard professional practice

“Technology policy violation”:

Shieh apparently used university email appropriately
Standard student communication
Common journalism practice
No evidence of violation
Post-hoc charge addition

The specific charges reflected:

Weaponization of university disciplinary procedures
Attempt to silence student journalism
Retaliation disguised as policy enforcement
Chilling effect on student speech
Brown administration fear of accountability

The Trademark Escalation

Jordan explored the further retaliation.

“And then what happened in the investigation? Well, then they escalated and they in charge the entire board of directors of the Brown Spectator for violating Brown’s trademark because our publication is named the Brown Spectator, which is just a completely bogus claim.”

Jordan questioned: “Are the other newspapers that Brown would use Brown in the name of the paper? Yes. Are other newspapers that Brown did? Probably in the entire history of the university, there’s been some kind of Brown publication, right? Certainly. Yeah, I mean, that’s just ridiculous.”

The Trademark Absurdity

The Brown trademark claim was legally problematic.

The Brown Spectator name:

“Brown” referred to Brown University (the institution)
“Spectator” was the publication type
Standard college newspaper format
Identified the publication’s affiliation
Not actually confusing about identity

Brown University trademark position:

Claimed trademark violation
Argued publication name was infringing
Targeted entire editorial board
Tried to shut down publication
Used trademark law as retaliation tool

The legal problem:

Nominative fair use allows references to trademark owner
Brown couldn’t claim trademark on “Brown” for student publications
Publications about Brown naturally use Brown’s name
No trademark confusion resulted
Brown’s claim was legally frivolous

The pattern:

University lawyers leveraging resources against student
Student without legal team
Brown’s attempt to overwhelm him
Financial pressure as silencing tool
Classic institutional attack on dissent

The outcome:

Brown eventually cleared Shieh
All charges dropped
Dismissed after Congressional attention
Shieh’s perseverance paid off
But damage to Brown’s reputation was done

Jordan’s Strategic Analysis

Jordan then pivoted to broader analysis.

“Why do you really think they did it? Why did they really come after you?” Jordan asked.

Shieh: “I think that they were upset that we unveiled the rot that was going on. All these administrators with pretty useless jobs.”

Jordan extended the analysis: “And that’s certainly one reason they were mad at you. But I think it’s probably more. I think they were trying to make sure no one else would do it in the future.”

He delivered the key insight: “That’s always the way it works. The left comes after people. They will they want to chill speech so it doesn’t happen again.”

Jordan asked: “Do you think that was part of their motivation?”

Shieh: “I think that certainly was true, but it backfired terribly.”

Jordan: “I did. Sure did because you’re brave enough to keep talking. Keep you can come here and testify. So God bless you for doing that.”

The Chilling Effect Strategy

Jordan identified a specific institutional pattern.

The “chill speech” strategy:

Target specific individuals for retaliation
Disproportionate response to deter others
Create fear of similar consequences
Silence legitimate questions
Preserve institutional privilege

Why this pattern mattered:

Well-documented in corporate contexts
Commonly used in activist targeting
Standard in progressive institutional response
Effective at silencing opposition
Constitutional concerns at universities

The Brown specific application:

Shieh’s investigation was journalistically legitimate
Questions were reasonable
Methods were proper
But Brown treated it as severe offense
Used disciplinary process as weapon

The backfire element:

Shieh kept talking
Media covered the story
Congressional attention increased
Public awareness grew
Intended silencing had opposite effect

Shieh’s successful resistance demonstrated that:

Universities could be challenged
Institutional power had limits
Courage mattered
Public attention was protective
Congressional oversight could be effective

The Cartel Analysis

Jordan transitioned to the broader antitrust issues.

“Now, you can have a direct this to you, Mr. Martin, you can have a bloated bureaucracy when you’re colluding on price and not and making sure you’re not competing on price with other similarly situated institutions. That right, Mr. Martin?”

Witness (Mr. Martin): “Yes.”

Jordan: “And you’re not supposed to do that, are you?”

Martin: “According to the law.”

Jordan: “Is that right, Mr. Martin? On price, it’s per se unlawful.”

Martin: “It’s per se.”

Jordan: “Unlawful.”

The Per Se Illegality

Jordan identified the specific legal framework.

“Per se unlawful” means:

Automatically illegal
No need to prove harm
No business justification defense available
Simply agreeing to fix prices is enough
Strictest antitrust category

Why elite universities face this issue:

Allegations of coordinated tuition setting
Shared financial aid formulas
Overlap in admissions practices
Information sharing on student finances
Effective price coordination

The Overlap Group history:

Ivy League universities had previously been investigated
1980s-1990s cases on financial aid coordination
Government found price-fixing in financial aid
Universities paid settlements
Restrictions were placed on coordination

Current concerns:

Similar patterns allegedly recurring
Modern information technology enabling coordination
Algorithmic coordination
Elite school cartel-like behavior
Need for enforcement

The Output Limitation

Jordan identified another antitrust dimension.

“You can also have bloated bureaucracy when you collude on price and you limit output, you limit class size. Is that right, Mr. Martin?”

Martin: “That’s correct.”

The Class Size Restriction

The class size limitation was a specific antitrust concern.

Why class size matters:

Fixed class sizes limit total enrollment
Coordinated size decisions affect total output
Limited competition among elite schools
Students forced to accept high prices
Cartel-like coordination of output

The specific patterns:

Elite schools maintain relatively constant class sizes
Despite growing applicant pools
Despite endowment growth
Despite infrastructure capacity
Despite demand

The antitrust implications:

Coordinated output restriction
Price maintenance at high levels
Barrier to entry for new schools
Limited choice for students
Classic cartel behavior

The Brown-specific issue:

Brown had maintained similar class sizes
Despite increasing costs
Despite increasing demand
Despite administrative growth
Despite potential capacity

The Perfect Price Discrimination

Jordan identified a third dimension.

“And do you think that’s going on at these? Oh, there’s a third one. You can also do all this if you engage in perfect price discrimination where you get all this information on the student and their families, what they make, where it goes, what they owe, what their retirement is, all this information you can say, that student can pay this amount and you’ll take it right to the edge where they can pay and get perfect price discrimination.”

The Information-Based Pricing

Perfect price discrimination was particularly concerning.

How it works:

Universities collect extensive family financial data
Including detailed income information
Debt information
Retirement assets
Other financial details

Why this matters:

Family financial aid calculations based on this data
Students/families pay what they can afford
Not market-based pricing
Customized pricing per family
Extractive rather than competitive

The specific practice:

Students submit detailed financial information
Schools calculate family ability to pay
Financial aid adjusted to extract maximum
Students pay up to their financial limit
No opportunity for market-based savings

Why it’s problematic:

Bypasses normal price competition
Treats tuition as rent-seeking rather than service price
Exploits information asymmetry
Creates no competitive pressure for efficiency
Enables bloat because extraction continues

Jordan’s point: “So when you do those three things, you can afford to have 3,805 administrators for 7,000 students.”

The Complete Cartel Behavior

Jordan summarized the cartel analysis.

“You make an excellent point. The more perfect the information, the more perfect the collusion can be algorithmically or otherwise.”

Jordan: “Of course. And that’s exactly what’s going on.”

Dr. Cooper (witness): “The evidence is certainly consistent with that, yes.”

Jordan delivered the conclusion: “That’s what the evidence shows.”

The Political Dimension

Jordan addressed the broader political context.

“And yet the other side says, oh, how dare Mr. Fitzgerald have this hearing? You’ve got to be kidding me. They tried to chill the speech of a news publication at the university for a student. They’re supposed to be serving asking a simple and fundamental question. And they want to chill that because they don’t want anyone to look under the covers and see that they’re colluding on price. They’re limiting output and they’re doing perfect price discrimination. Imagine that. Imagine that.”

He concluded: “And we’re not supposed to have a hearing? Holy cow.”

He offered thanks: “I want to thank the chairman for doing the hearing. I want to thank all of you for testifying. And Mr. Shea, thank you for stepping forward and letting the country know what’s going on at these elite universities.”

Key Takeaways

Brown University: $93K/year × 7,000 students = $700M annually, with 3,805 administrators (1 per 1.8 students).
Shieh asked 3,805 Brown administrators: “What do you do all day?” Most didn’t respond.
Brown retaliated with disciplinary charges: “Emotional and psychological harm, invasion of privacy, trademark violation.”
Jordan’s antitrust analysis: Ivy League engages in per se illegal price collusion, output restriction, perfect price discrimination.
Student Alex Shieh successfully resisted silencing; Brown eventually cleared him after Congressional attention.